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COMMENTS
ATTACHMENT OF "OBLIGATIONS"-A NEW CHAPTER
IN LONG-ARM JURISDICTION
Recently, the Court of Appeals "enacted" a substantial change in the law of
attachments by allowing the attachment of the obligations in an insurance policy
owned by a non-resident defendant. The Court allowed the attachment even
though the defendant's only contact with New York was that the policy was
issued by an insurer doing business in New York. This Comment will summarize
the law of attachments prior to this change, explain its rationale and demonstrate
several possible extensions to other areas of the law.
Plaintiff, a resident of New York, was involved in an automobile accident in
Vermont with defendant,' a resident of Canada. Defendant owned an insurance
policy which was issued in Canada by an insurance company doing business in
New York for purposes of jurisdiction under New York Civil Practice Law and
Rules section 301. The policy contained clauses stating that the insurer would de-
fend and indemnify the insured for an action brought against him. Although the
defendant (insured) was not subject to in personam jurisdiction pursuant to the
New York long-arm statute,2 the Supreme Court of Nassau County denied defend-
ant's motion to vacate an order of attachment issued against the obligations in his
insurance policy.3 The court considered the obligations in the policy an attachable
debt 4 within the state for purposes of the attachment statute. The Appellate Di-
vision and the Court of Appeals affirmed, held, although owned by a non-resident
who is not subject to in personam jurisdiction, the obligations to defend and in-
demnify in an insurance policy are an attachable debt when the policy is issued by
an insurer doing business in New York. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.-
2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966), affirming 23 A.D.2d 787, 258 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st
Dep't).
INqTRODUCTION
For a court to exercise jurisdiction it must have subject-matter jurisdiction,6
give proper notice to the partiesr and have a sufficient jurisdictional basis over
the person or res. Traditionally, basis was couched in terms of a state's power
or control over a person or res at the time of service of process8 However, this
concept of physical power has suffered so much change that the exceptions have
become the rules. If a corporation is present or "doing business" within a state,
1. The accident was a three-car collision. Roth, a resident of New York, was a co-
defendant with Lemiux, a resident of Canada, on whom the immediate litigation is focused.
2. New York Civil Practice Law and Rules [hereinafter cited N.Y. CPLRI § 302.
3. Seider v. Roth, 152 N.Y.LJ., Oct. 21, 1964, p. 19, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
4. N.Y. CPLR § 5201.
5. N.Y. CPLR § 6202.
6. See Elliot v. Peirsol, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 328 (1828).
7. See Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) ; Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
8. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905);
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the state can exercise in personam jurisdiction over the corporation.9 A state can
also assert in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident or a corporation in special
situations, e.g., where a person is involved in an accident while operating a
motor vehicle in the state, 10 or where an insurance company has a policy-holder
within the the state."- In addition, if a person or corporation has certain "mini-
mum contacts' 2 with the forum state, the state is considered to have sufficient
power over the defendant to exercise in personam jurisdiction, thus satisfying
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 3 The "minimum
contacts" doctrine has engendered the growth of long-arm statutes which are
used to assert in personam jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant based on his
tenuous contacts with the state-restricted or specific in personam jurisdiction.' 4
A state having sufficient power over a particular res is traditionally con-
sidered to have in rem or quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Attachment and garnishment
of real or personal property is a statutory 3 proceeding which confers in rem or
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction on the attaching court.'0 Garnishment is a form of at-
tachment: a process by which a res is seized from the possession of a third
person (garnishee) because it is presently or certain to become due to the de-
fendant and may become directly payable to the plaintiff, depending on the out-
come of their litigation.17
Quasi-in-rem jurisdiction differs from in rem and in personam jurisdiction.
An in rem judgment determines the status of a particular res as "against the whole
world" irrespective of the parties involved in the litigation.' s An in personam
judgment decides particular personal rights between the adversary parties. In a
quasi-in-rem proceeding adversary parties litigate personal claims, but, unlike
an in personam judgment, the satisfaction of the quasi-in-rem judgment is limited
to the value of the attached res.' 9
The state must have power over the res, or more laconically, the res must be
9. See Barrow S.S. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898); Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220
N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917); Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d
439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965) ; Note, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 431 (1966).
10. See N.Y. Veh. and Traf. Law § 253(1); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
11. See N.Y. Ins. Law § 59-a; McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 335 U.S. 220 (1957).
12. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). See Hazard, A
General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 241.
13. Id. at 316.
14. See, e.g., Uniform Interstate & International Procedure Act, 9B Uniform Laws Ann.
310 (1966); N.Y. CPLR § 302 (as amended N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 590). For a com-
prehensive study of New York's long-arm statute, see Homburger & Laufer, Expanding
J irisdiction Over Foreign Torts: The 1966 Amendment of New York's Long-Arm Statute,
16 Buffalo L. Rev. 67 (1966); Homburger, The Reach of New York's Long-Arm Statute:
Today and Tomorrow, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 61 (1965); Comment, Transacting Business as
Jurisdictional Basis-A Survey of New York Case Law, 14 Buffalo L. Rev. 525 (1965);
Note, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 181 (1965).
15. See 7 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil Practice, f111 6201-26 (1964).
16. See generally Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction In Rem To Compel Payment of
a Debt, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 107 (1913).
17. See Goodrich, Conflicts of Law § 71 (4th ed. Scoles 1964).




located within the attaching state?20 A res can be realty or tangible or intangible
personalty. If the res is realty, its situs within the forum is a readily ascertainable
fact. L2 1 But if it is personalty, the problem of situs becomes more difficult.22
Although tangible personalty is generally mobile, a state is considered to have a
sufficient power basis if at the time of attachment, it is found within its borders. 23
On the other hand, with intangible personalty it is often difficult to discover or
even conceptualize a situs which will enable a state to exert jurisdictional
power 24
Many intangibles, such as stocks, bonds, warehouse receipts and other
negotiable instruments and securities, are evidenced by a document, thus allow-
ing jurisdiction to be asserted where the document is located.2 5 However, if it is
a "pure" intangible, such as a debt, an assignable cause of action or a court
judgment, the state has jurisdiction over the intangible property if it has juris-
diction over the debtor 2 6
To be attachable under the statute, a debt must be "past due or which is yet
to become due, certainly or upon demand .... ,"27 Whether the obligations in an
insurance policy are a debt or a contingency not subject to attachment is a diffi-
cult question. The majority of states that have passed on this question have held
that the obligations in an insurance policy are an attachable debt in the state
where the policy is issued.28 New York follows this rule,29 reasoning that if they
are to be attachable, at least one of the obligations in the policy must not be
conditional. 30
RATIONALE AND C]uTIcism OF SEIDER
Pre-Seider Attachment of Obligations in an Insurance Policy
Seider v. Roth31 has caused a substantial change in the law of New York.
There were several cases prior to Seider in which New York courts allowed at-
20. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
21. For causes of action arising from the use, possession or ownership of real property
in New York a court can exercise in personam jurisdiction. See N.Y. CPLR § 302 (a) (4) (as
amended 1966).
22. See Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 909,
at 951.
23. See 1 Beale, Conflict of Laws § 102 (1935).
24. See generally Andrews, Situs of Intangibles in Suits Against Non-Resident Claim-
ants, 49 Yale L.J. 241 (1939).
25. See Beal, supra note 16; Andrews, supra note 24.
26. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) (In a garnishment action, a court has juris-
diction over the debt if it has jurisdiction over the garnishee.). But compare Morris Plan
Indus. Bank v. Gunning, 295 N.Y. 324, 67 N.E.2d 510 (1946), with Brown v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 53 Misc. 2d 182, 278 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
27. N.Y. CPLR § 5201(a) (Emphasis added.).
28. Note, U. Cinc. L. Rev. 691, 693 (1966).
29. Matter of Riggle, 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962), 14
Syracuse L. Rev. 130 (1962); see also Baumgold Bros. v. Schwarzschild Bros., 276 App.
Div. 158, 93 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 628, 97 N.E.2d 357 (1949) (obligation
accrues upon proof of loss).
30. Cf. Sheehy v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 266 N.Y. 44, 193 N.E. 633 (1934);
Dutch-American Merchantile Corp. v. Safticraft Corp., 17 A.D.2d 421, 234 N.Y.S.2d 683
(1st Dep't 1962).
31. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966), 8 B.C. Indus. & Comm.
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tachment of the obligations in an insurance policy as a debt within the purview
of the statute, but they are easily distinguishable. In Baumgold Bros., Inc., v.
Schwarzckild Bros.,32 plaintiff, a New York corporation, had jewels delivered to
defendant, a Virginia corporation, pursuant to a contract. The jewels were stolen
from defendant's Virginia office. Plaintiff attached the proceeds of defendant's
insurance policy issued by an insurer authorized to do business in New York. In
this case the court had in personam jurisdiction over the insurer and, although
not expressly stated, over the defendant based on his business contacts.33
In Matter of Riggle,34 plaintiff, a resident of New York, was injured in
Wyoming in an automobile accident with a resident of Illinois. The defendant
died after a New York court had exercised in personam jurisdiction over him.
The insurance policy was issued in New York by an insurer doing business in
New York. In the present proceeding plaintiff attempted to have the Surrogate's
Court appoint an administrator in New York by claiming that the obligations in
defendant's insurance policy were an asset within the state. The Court of Appeals
held that the obligations in the insurance policy are a sufficient debt within the
meaning of section 47 of New York Surrogate's Court Act3" to confer jurisdiction
upon a Surrogate's Court, thus enabling it to appoint an administrator in New
York for the non-resident's estate. Thus, unlike Seider, New York had in per-
sonam jurisdiction over both the insured and the insurer. In addition, this pro-
ceeding was one of limited subject-matter jurisdiction, rather than one of general
jurisdiction as in Seider. In Fishman v. Sanders,36 plaintiff and defendant, both
residents of New York, were involved in an auto accident in New York. Plaintiff
was unable to personally serve defendant, so he attached the obligations of de-
fendant's insurance policy issued by an insurer doing business in New York.
However, plaintiff had in personam jurisdiction over both the insurer and the
insured, because the Court held that substituted service and attachment gave the
attaching court in personam jurisdiction over an absconding resident.3 7 Finally,
in Stines v. Hertz Corp.,38 plaintiff, a resident of New York, was involved in an
L. Rev. 147 (1966), 51 Minn. L. Rev. 158 (1966), 19 Stan. L. Rev. 654 (1967), U. Cinc. L.
Rev. 691 (1966).
32. 267 App. Div. 158, 93 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 628, 97 N.E.2d
357 (1949).
33. In any case, a New York court could probably now assert in personam jurisdiction
over the defendant under N.Y. CPLR § 302 (a) (1) ("transacts any business"), if defendant
was not subject to in personam jurisdiction in this case.
34. 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962).
35. N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act 1 47 provides in part that "for the purpose of conferring juris-
diction upon a surrogate's court, a debt owing to a decedent by a resident of the state ...
is regarded as personal property." See New York Surrogate's Court Procedure Act § 208
(N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 953, effective Sept. 1, 1967) which continues the old provision
and apparently codifies Riggle.
36. 20 A.D.2d 905, 248 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (2d Dep't 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 15
N.Y.2d 298, 206 N.E.2d 326, 258 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1965), 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 425 (1965).
37. Fishman v. Sanders, 15 N.Y.2d 298, 206 N.E.2d 326, 258 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1965)
(Defendant defaulted and the Court held that the judgment rendered against the defendant,
after service by publication and attachment of personalty, was an in personam judgment and
not limited to the value of the res.).
38. 42 Misc. 2d 443, 248 N.Y.S.2d 242 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 22 A.D.2d
7,72
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auto accident in Iowa. The car was rented from an Iowa office of the Hertz Cor-
poration 9 which was also doing business in New York. Plaintiff attached the
obligations in defendant's insurance policy. As in previous cases, the court had
in personam jurisdiction over the defendant (insured) who in this case also ap-
peared to be the insurer.
Criticism of Seider
Maintaining in the instant case that Riggle "cannot be distinguished
away,"'40 the Court of Appeals in a 4-3 decision stated that "as soon as the
accident occurred there was imposed on Hartford a contractual obligation which
should be considered [an attachable] 'debt'." 41 Although the general rule is that
where an obligation is a service to be performed instead of money or its equiva-
lent, it is not attachable, 42 the Court failed to comment on this distinction.
In addition, it is not clear whether the Court read the obligation to defend
and indemnify as one attachable debt or whether the obligation to defend by
itself constituted the attachable debt.43 If the former is the correct interpreta-
tion, it would seem that the obligation is contingent until reduced to judgment,
which in turn means that in personam jurisdiction is needed over the defendant. 44
On the other hand, if the latter interpretation is what the Court intended, more
problems are seen. As stated, the obligation to defend is a service which is
difficult, if not impossible, to measure in terms of a monetary value because of
the nature of the variables involved in defending a suit, e.g., the length of the
trial, the amount of pre-trial investigation needed and the cost to procure at-
tendance of parties and witnesses at the litigation proceedings.
As Professor Siegel has suggested, if the defendant defaults the obligation
to defend will have to be sold by the sheriff at public auction or be measured in
a special proceeding to compel the garnishee (insurer) to transfer the property
or its value.45 Indeed, attempting to measure the obligation to defend will pos-
sibly create the most difficult situation to resolve.
It is in the insurer's interest to defend and, for all practical purposes, he
823, 254 N.Y.S.2d 903 (3d Dep't 1964), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 605, 201 N.E.2d 59, 261 N.Y.S.2d
59 (1965).
39. It is not clear whether plaintiff was a passenger in a car rented from Hertz or a
passenger in a car involved in an accident with a Hertz car.
40. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101 (1966).
41. Ibid.
42. See, e.g., Willard v. Butler, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 550 (1834).
43. See generally Siegel, Practice Commentary to § 5201, 7B McKinney's Consol. Laws
15-20 (Supp. 1966).
44. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d at 115, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 103 (1966)
(dissenting opinion); cf. Quebec Auto Ins. Policy, Form No. Q.P.F.I., Hartford Fire Ins. Co.
-Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., Part I § A, Additional Agreements (3) which provides
that "the Insurer further agrees to defend in the name and on the behalf of any person
insured by this policy any civil action which may at any time be brought against such person
on account of . . .loss or damages to persons or property." Record on Appeal, Seider v.
Roth, 23 A.D.2d 787, 258 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't 1966) (Emphasis added.). But see Sheehy
v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 266 N.Y. 44, 193 N.E. 633 (1934) (at least part of the
obligations must be unconditional).
45. Siegel, supra note 43.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
will probably do so in all cases. Nevertheless, if he does permit a default judg-
ment to be entered against the defendant, enforcement problems may arise where
the defendant is a resident of a foreign nation or the insurer is a foreign corpo-
ration. Should the foreign insurer decide to terminate his business activities in
New York,46 the plaintiff may have a difficult time levying on the intangible.
This is especially true where the plaintiff has to travel to the foreign country
and attempt to enforce his default judgment.47
Finally, there is a question of what would happen where the insurer was
only obligated to indemnify the defendant (insured) for all losses incurred.48
If an insurer should choose to delete the clause to defend from the policy, it is
probable that the obligation to indemnify, by itself, is a contingent non-attachable
debt until reduced to judgment.49
Seider v. Roth 0 can be criticized on several other grounds. One result of
Seider is that it has by judicial decision created a "direct action" against the
insurer,51 although the legislature had not previously acted on this matter. Al-
though the defendant can default and lose the value of the res, this will not
happen because it is in the interests of the insurer to defend him and perhaps
minimize its damages.5 2 Thus, the insurer will undoubtedly defend in most cases
-in effect a direct action. This result is not warranted, based on judicial prec-
edent and the lack of legislative action.
The majority in Seider stated53 that Oltarsh v. Aetna Ins. Co.5 4 had in effect
already established a direct action in New York. However, this case is easily
distinguished from Seider. Plaintiff, a New York resident, was injured in Puerto
Rico by a Puerto Rican corporation's negligence. Plaintiff commenced an action
in New York against the corporation's insurer who was doing business in both
Puerto Rico and New York. Puerto Rico has a direct action statute.5 In a cir-
cular manner,5 6 the Court held that the direct action statute was substantive
and not procedural, thus compelling the application of Puerto Rican law. In
46. See Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d
625 (1965), 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 431 (1965) (demonstrates that doing business is not much
different from "transacting any business").
47. See generally Kulzer, Some Aspects of Enforceability of Foreign Judgments: A
Comparative Summary, 16 Buffalo L. Rev. 84 (1966); Nadelman, Non-Recognition of
American Money Judgments Abroad and What To Do About It, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236, 246-
49 (1957) (specific problems of enforcing American judgments in Canada).
48. This situation will probably not occur because it is in the insurer's interest to see
that expenses are minimized. This is best furthered by defending its insured's lawsuits cov-
ered by the policy, since its expertise in negligence cases will ensure that defendant is pro-
vided with a good defense.
49. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
50. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312,269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
51. See Note, Direct-Action Statutes: Their Operational and Conflict-of-Law Problems,
74 Harv. L. Rev. 357 (1960); Comment, The Insurer's Duty To Defend Under a Liability
Insurance Policy, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 734 (1966).
52. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
53. 17 N.Y.2d at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
54. 15 N.Y.2d 111, 204 N.E.2d 622, 256 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1965).
55. P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 26, § 2001, 2003 (1963).
56. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, the "bootstrap" manner in which
the Court exercised jurisdiction by employing conflicts-of-law doctrine is questionable.
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Seider, however, Vermont did not have a direct action statute. Moreover, most
direct action statutes provide that in order to be applicable, the insurance
policy must have been issued in the forum state, the accident have occurred in
the forum state or the forum have in personam jurisdiction over the defendant.'
Finally, section 167(1) (b) of the New York Insurance Law can be read
to imply a legislative disapproval of a direct action. Section 167(1) (b) provides
that if a judgment is rendered against the insured, he can maintain an action
against the insurer if, thirty days after notice of the judgment, any amount re-
mains unpaid for which the insurer is obligated under the policy. 5 If the legis-
lature does not allow a defendant to proceed against his insurer until after judg-
ment, it is difficult to rationalize Seider's result of permitting a direct action by a
plaintiff against a defendant's insurer before judgment, without legislative
leadership.
Traditionally, quasi-in-rem jurisdiction based on attachment has been di-
rected at the absconding resident who cannot be found for personal service of
process"9 and the non-resident who uses or owns property in the forum state.
Although attachment "deprives the defendant of the use and enjoyment of his
property at an extremely embryonic stage of the litigation and long before the
defendant's liability to the plaintiff is established, '60 it is defended on the
grounds that it provides security by giving the plaintiff something from which
he can satisfy a subsequent judgment and by helping to ensure that the resident
defendant will appear in the litigation.6 1 However, Seider cannot be rationalized
on these grounds. Instead, plaintiff has in personam jurisdiction over the non-
resident defendant for all practical purposes since it is not in the insurer's in-
terests to allow the defendant to default. This result will occur even though the
defendant's only contact with the forum is that he fortuitously owns an insurance
policy issued by an insurer doing business in New York. In addition, a default
judgment will in effect be in personam with respect to recoverable damages. Al-
though satisfaction of a quasi-in-rem judgment is limited to the value of the res
or the value of the obligations in the policy, this will in most cases cover plain-
57. See Note, supra note 51. Arguably, the type of direct action Seider establishes
contravenes due process limitations applicable to direct action statutes. See Home Ins. Co. v.
Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
58. Cf. Ross v. Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co. 13 N.Y.2d 233, 195 N.E.2d 892, 246 N.Y.S.2d
213 (1963) (X (insured) was involved in a car accident with Y. X sued Z (insurer) for
indemnification under the policy, and Z attempted to implead Y on the ground that Y may
be liable to Z. The court, disallowing the impleader, held that Z was not entitled to any rights
of subrogation until a judgement is entered against Y.). See Quebec Auto Ins. Policy, supra
note 44, Part I, Conditions 9t 12(2) which provides that "the Insured may not bring an
action to recover the amount of a claim under this policy .. .until the amount of the loss
has been ascertained ...by a judgement against the Insured after trial of the issue, or by
agreement between the parties with the written consent of the Insurer." Thus the Court in
Seider has rewritten the typical insurance contract. Cf. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur.
Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
59. Cf. supra note 37 and accompanying text.
60. 7 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, op. cit. supra note 15, ff 6201.02.
61. See Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rent Jurisdiction, 76 Harv. L.
Rev. 303 (1962).
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tiff's damages or come close to the amount he could recover if the judgment were
in personam6 2
In a situation like Seider plaintiff enjoys the benefits of in personam
jurisdiction, but he does not suffer any of its corresponding detriments, such as
res judicata. Modern jurisdictional concepts are based on res judicata considera-
tions of litigational expediency, efficiency and finality.0 3 Seider does not appear
to further these considerations. "While a valid quasi-in-rem judgment begun
by attachment or garnishment is conclusive as to interests in the property or
obligation involved, it is not conclusive without jurisdiction over the defendant,
as to the personal cause of action.18 4 Nor is there a merger of the claim and
judgment when the property is sufficient to satisfy the judgment.05 Thus, the
defendant is possibly subject to further harassment if plaintiff can later assert
in personam jurisdiction over him. This is another questionable result which the
majority in Seider failed to consider.
Seider raises some possible constitutional problems, for it is not clear that
the defendant has sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum state to satisfy
the due process requirements of "fair play and substantial justice."00 Although
for all practical purposes plaintiff has in personam jurisdiction, the defendant
has had no consensual or purposive contacts which have resulted in consequences
with the forum state. The same argument can tangentially apply to the insurer.
Even though the insurer is clearly subject to in personam jurisdiction for doing
business here, New York's interest to adjudicate plaintiff's cause of action is
questionable and will probably subject the insurer to added inconvenience and
expense.67 An illustration will help to clarify this point. Suppose plaintiff, a
62. Generally a person owns insurance proportionate to the size of his estate. Thus,
an indigent defendant's estate will probably not consist of more than the extent of his
coverage under the policy. The converse will be true where the defendant is wealthy, i.e.,
a wealthy person will usually own enough insurance so that his estate will not have to be
touched except in unusual cases.
63. See generally Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 909 (1960).
64. Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818, 834 (1952).
65. Ibid. However, New York is probably an exception to this general rule; i.e., New
York courts consider a default judgment to be a judgment on the merits. See, e.g., Goebel v.
Iffla, 111 N.Y. 170, 18 N.E. 649 (1888). Thus in New York, the default judgment will merge
with plaintiff's claim and act as a bar, in a future action, to all issues pleaded in the original
complaint. See Gates v. Preston, 41 N.Y. 113 (1869). Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York
Practice Manual 29-2, at nn. 12-14 (1967). Nonetheless, other states may not recognize the
New York default judgment as a judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata in their
respective states.
66. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945); ef. Currie, The
Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. Ill. L.F.
533, 549 ("[Tihe defendant must have taken voluntary action calculated to have an effect
in the forum state.").
67. Seider is a borderline case, for New York arguably has a fairly strong claim to
adjudicate plaintiff's cause of action, viz., plaintiff was a resident of New York, one of the
co-defendants was a resident of New York and plaintiff was treated for injuries in New
York. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee pp. 7-12, Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d
312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). Although Seider may be correctly decided, the danger of its
rationale is that jurisdiction is based merely on an insurer's doing business in New York.
The Court did not consider other probative matters giving New York its interest to adjudi.
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resident of New York is involved in an automobile accident in California with a
resident of California.68 Plaintiff owns an insurance policy issued by a California
insurer, who has sufficient contacts to be doing business in New York for juris-
dictional purposes. Plaintiff attaches the obligations in New York. Thus, the
insurer will be forced to defend in New York because a default judgment as to
the interests in the property is entitled to "full faith and credit" in California if
he cannot be served in New York.69 Surely, this approaches, if not violates,
the limits of those "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."70
Another due process argument is that both the insured and the insurer for
all practical purposes are deprived of a rational choice of alternative modes of
action. As stated,7' attachment and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction are intended to
give the defendant a choice between defending the suit or losing the res. This is
especially true in a state such as New York which does not recognize a limited
appearance to defend the res.7 2 But in a situation like Seider, both the insured
and the insurer are in effect subjected to in personam jurisdiction without this
rational choice even though they have few interests in the forum state with
respect to the immediate cause of action.
Finally, an argument can be maintained that Seider contains the seeds of an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce by unduly burdening insurance
companies with unwarranted inconvenience and expense, which in turn will be
passed on to the insureds as premiums.7 3 It also contravenes the basis purpose
of the commerce clause because it establishes a form of state chauvinism plac-
ing its questionable interests above the interests of other states. Thus, Seider
arguably imposes a form of regulation on interstate commerce where there is
little justification to do so. 7 4
POSSIBLE ExTENsIONS OF TIE Seider RATIONALE
The majority in Seider carefully limited the holding to the obligations to
defend and indemnify in an insurance policy as an attachable debt where the
cate, and in turn set guidelines for the lower courts to follow. This is evidenced by the
example in the text. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
68. Cf. Jones v. McNeill, 51 Misc. 2d 527, 273 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (Plaintiff,
a resident of New York and defendant, a resident of California were involved in an auto-
mobile accident in New Mexico. Plaintiff attached the obligations in defendant's insurance
policy issued by an insurer doing business in New York.).
69. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
70. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 317 (1945).
71. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
72. N.Y. CPLR 320(c); see Homburger & Laufer, Appearance and Jurisdictional
Motions in New York, 14 Buffalo L. Rev. 374 (1965).
73. See Developments, supra note 63, at 963; Homburger & Laufer, Expanding Jurisdic-
tion Over Foreign Torts: The 1966 Amendment of New York's Long-Arm Statute, 16 Buffalo
L. Rev. 67, 79-80 (1966); see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vaage, 265 F. Supp. 556, 559
n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (The court also denied injunctive relief to prevent sheriffs from levying
on insurance policies issued outside New York to non-resident plaintiffs.); Jones v. McNeill,
51 Misc. 2d at 533, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 522 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (The court rejected this contention,
reasoning that attaching the obligations in defendant's insurance policy presented no "undue
interference" with interstate commerce.).
74. But see supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. Cf. infra notes 91-95 and ac-
companying text.
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only contact with the forum is that the insurer is doing business there. However,
this same rationale can be extended to other areas with less legerdemain than
was used in Seider.
It will be difficult to extend the Seider rationale to tangible personalty and
intangible personalty evidenced by a document, because the situs is where the
document is found. 75 In addition, New York provides by statute that a security
is not validly attached until it is seized by proper process.70 Thus, the mere
presence of a corporation doing business in New York will not guarantee the
attachment of intangible personalty unless the evidence of the intangible is
physically seizable within the state's borders.
However, if the personalty is a "pure" intangible, the rationale of Seider is
easily extended merely by varying the nature of the attachable "debt." The
most obvious are those with a fact situation like Seider, viz., where the defendant
is a non-resident and defendant's obligor is doing buisiness within the forum.
For example, although plaintiff could not attach defendant's stock issued by a
company doing business in New York unless it is physically seizable within the
forum, 77 plaintiff could logically attach the dividends accruing to the stock any
time after the declaration date as long as they remain unpaid to the defendant.
Thus, regardless of whether plaintiff's cause of action is based on a tort or
contract or whether the cause of action has any relation with the forum, plaintiff
can logically attach any non-secured obligation payable to the non-resident
defendant by a company doing business in New York.
Another possible extension of Seider is in the area of trusts and estates. It
has already been demonstrated that for purposes of jurisdiction pursuant to
New York Surrogate's Court Act section 47, the insurer's obligation to defend
and indemnify is an asset in the state facilitating the appointment of an ad-
ministrator in New York.78 Query: is it possible for plaintiff to have an ad-
ministrator appointed in New York where he has a cause of action based on tort
or contract against a deceased non-resident defendant, whose only contact with
the forum is that his estate is the beneficiary of a trust whose trustee is doing
business in New York? The answer is yes. Although for purposes of jurisdiction
the general rule is that the trustee must be a resident of the state or the trust
be funded and located within the state,79 plaintiff can logically claim the trust
and/or the income accrued and payable to the beneficiary is an asset in the forum
for purposes of appointing an administrator in New York.80 Also, the trust and
75. See Andrews, Situs of Intangibles in Suits Against Non-Resident Clainants, 49
Yale LJ. 241 (1939).
76. Uniform Commercial Code § 8-317(1) provides:
No attachment or levy upon a security or any share or other interest evidenced
thereby which is outstanding shall be valid until the security is actually seized by
the officer making the attachment or levy but a security which has been surrendered
to the issuer may be attached or levied upon at the source.
See also, to same effect, N.Y. CPLR § 5201(c) (4).
77. Uniform Commercial Code § 8-317(1).
78. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
79. See Andrews, supra note 75, at 253.
80. Of course, this assumes that the laws of the attaching state and the laws of the
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especially the trust's accrued income held by a company doing business in New
York is logically attachable as a debt pursuant to sections 5201 and 6202 of
the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules for purposes of general subject-
matter jurisdiction. Thus, large corporations, trust companies and particularly
mutual funds are vulnerable to an extension of Seider.
Another extension of the Seider rationale is one concerning a simple contract
debt. New York courts have shown a reluctance to assert in personam jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant pursuant to the long-arm statute's "transacting
any business" clause8 ' unless he has had several business contacts in New
York.8 2 Thus, a contract, which is to be performed in New York and which has
been breached, is not a sufficient contact for which a New York court will exer-
cise in personam jurisdiction over a defendant who has no other contacts with
the forum, such as solicitations, negotiations or the signing of the contract.8 3
Query: is this contract debt an attachable debt within the state for purposes of
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction? The author believes it is, if one uses the same question-
able logic as the majority in Seider. Thus, if a company doing business in New
York holds, in escrow, a contract or the proceeds of a contract between plaintiff
or a third party and non-resident defendant, and if the performance of the con-
tract is past due, the contract debt is logically an attachable debt within the
state. A similar result is possible where there is no company doing business in
New York holding the contract in escrow, but where there is solely a contract
between the plaintiff and non-resident defendant or resident defendant and again,
the performance of the contract is past due. Moreover, it is important to remem-
ber that defendant will either have to defend on the merits or default the value
of the res, which for all practical purposes is equivalent to an in personam
judgment.
As stated,8 4 Seider establishes a direct action when defendant is a non-
resident. Query: is a direct action now possible where both defendant and his
insurer are subject to in personam jurisdiction? Again, the answer is logically
yes. If the Court of Appeals can in effect establish a direct action as in Seider,
state in which the trust is funded do not contain provisions which would forbid the at-
tachment of the trust or the income accruing to the trust. See N.Y. CPLR §§ 5201(b) (no
attachment of right to income until accrued), 5231(b) (at least 10%), 5226 (possibly
more than 10% but in discretion of court).
This possible extension of Seider demonstrates two more potentially undesirable results
which the majority failed to consider, i.e., Seider creates the possibility of forum-shopping
plaintiffs. Forum shopping can in turn cause friction between states where one state subjects
the residents of another state to needless inconvenience and expense. See supra notes 67-68
and accompanying text. Cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Kurland, The Supreme
Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 569 (1958).
81. N.Y. CPLR § 302(a) (1).
82. See, e.g., Kramer v. Vogl, 17 N.Y.2d 27, 215 N.E.2d 159, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1966);
A. Millner Co. v. Noudar, Lda., 24 A.D.2d 326, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1st Dep't 1966); see
generally Comment, Transacting Business as Jurisdictional Basis-A Survey of New York
Case Law, 14 Buffalo L. Rev. 525 (1965).
83. Cf. Cleary, The Length of the Long Arm, 9 J. Pub. L. 293, 300 (1960).
84. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
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it is not conceptually difficult to do so in the hypothetical. The Court has already
intimated such a result.8 5
CONCLUSION
Seider has extended long-arm jurisdiction and the "minimum contacts"
doctrine far beyond the original intention of the legislature.80 The New York
long-arm statute permits a court to exercise in personam jurisdiction for causes
of action arising form certain enumerated acts within the state or resulting in
consequences within the state. In Seider and the hypothetical extensions, there
are no acts for which a court can assert in personam jurisdiction over the non-
resident defendant. More important, although plaintiff in Seider has in personam
jurisdiction for all practical purposes, the defendant is not provided with the
safeguards of the long-arm statute. That is to say, plaintiff can maintain an
action for any possible cause of action falling within the scope of the insurance
policy. Thus, plaintiff has general jurisdiction over the defendant (up to the
value of the attached property) in Seider and the hypothetical extensions, rather
than the restricted or specific jurisdiction obtainable under the long-arm statute.
If the same or a similar issue again comes before the Court of Appeals, it
should consider the demonstrated criticisms and ramifications it originally
neglected to consider.
Although a state has a strong interest in protecting its residents, it should
not do so when the situation is unwarranted. Whether the equities in a particular
litigation are with the plaintiff8 7 or the defendant 88 is debatable, but nonetheless,
a court should not merely apply mechanical rules of logic and "confine its
analysis solely to its own ideas of what is just, appropriate, and convenient. To a
degree it must take into account the views of other communities concerned." 80
Although New York presently does not recognize the doctrine of forum
non conveniens when applied to a resident plaintiff and a non-resident defen-
dant 0 it should re-consider this question, and in addition consider more proba-
tive factors before extending jurisdiction in a situation like Seider, viz., "the
defendant's ownership of tangible property in the state, the domicile of the
plaintiff in the state, the unavailability of another forum in which the controversy
can be adjudicated, and the risk of multiple liability if jurisdiction is denied."' 1
85. See Fishman v. Sanders, 20 A.D.2d 905, 248 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (2d Dep't 1964), rev'd
on other grounds, 15 N.Y.2d 298, 206 N.E.2d 326, 258 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1965), 15 Buffalo L.
Rev. 425 (1965) ; see supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
86. See Homburger & Laufer, supra note 73, at 67-76; Homburger, The Reach of New
York's Long-Arm Statute: Today and Tomorrow, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 61-66, 72-84 (1965).
87. See Cleary, supra note 83, at 299.
88. See von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis,
79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1127 (1966).
89. Ibid.
90. See Homburger & Laufer, supra note 72, at 374 n.4; but see 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(1964) which provides that: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest
of justice, a court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought."
91. See Note, supra note 63, at 965.
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Other relevant factors are the law applicable to a suit, "the availability of
evidence in the state, ... the relationship between the state or the defendant's
property in the state and (1) the transaction or occurrence which gave rise to
the suit, or (2) the objective of the action."9 2 In other words, it is possible that
the present categories of in personam, in rem and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction are
too arbitrary and self-limiting.93 Traditional notions of jurisdiction couched in
terms of power do not provide proper fairness to all parties involved. It would
perhaps be better to base jurisdiction on a more flexible concept, such as "forum
conveniens" or "competency to adjudicate" which would be more in tune with
modern jurisdictional needs 4 In any case, it has been suggested that with the
advent of long-arm statutes used to assert in personam jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant, quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is an outmoded and unfair proce-
dure.9 5
MICHAEL NELSON
AN APPRAISAL OF SECURITY LEGISLATION IN EDUCATION IN
LIGHT OF KEYISHIAN: A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Give us the child for 8 years, and it will be a Bolshevik forever....
He who has the youth, has the future.
-V. I. Lenin
Absolute security is achieved only in a graveyard.
-Justice Holmes
On January 23, 1967, the Supreme Court announced the decision in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents.' The subject of the decision is loyalty legislation;
the conflicting interests evidence a balancing of academic and constitutional
freedoms against public demand for legitimate state control of "subversive"
activity in a state educational system. Initial reactions to this decision are both
vehement and varied. Protagonists acclaim the decision a landmark for personal
92. Ibid.
93. See generally von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 88.
94. See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 Yale LJ. 289 (1956); Homburger & Laufer, supra note 73, at 78
(The authors suggest a "functional approach to the problem of jurisdiction, broadly rooted
in reasonableness, fair play and substantial justice."). Cf. Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49
Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub. nom. Columbia
Broadcasting System v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958), 46 Calif. L. Rev. 637 (1958) ; see 28
U.S.C. § 1397 (1964) (federal interpleader statute).
95. See Carrington, supra note 61; contra, Currie, Attachment and Garnishment in
the Federal Courts, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 337 (1961); cf. supra notes 36-37 and accompanying
text. See also Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Texas L. Rev. (1959).
However quasi-in-rem jurisdiction may have continuing viability where it is used to
prevent an absconding resident from selling or taking his property with him, thus avoiding
his creditors. Here it is used as a security device over a resident, rather than as a means to
exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident as in Seider.
1. 385 U.S. 589 (1967) [hereinafter cited Keyishian].
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